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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
NEIL CARLISLE and
EWELL dba CARLISLE AND
E'VELL, a partnership,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

CLIFFORD COX and ALLEN COX,
Defendants and Appellants

12,802

and V. LEWIS KOFFORD,
Defendant..

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff and the
respondents herein under the provisions of 14-2-1 and
14-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, to recover judgment
against the defendant and the appellants herein, Clifford Cox and Allen Cox, for the reasonable value of
materials installed and labor performed by the respondents as sub-contractors under a contract between
th appellants as owners and the defendant V. Lewis
Kofford, as general contractor, which contract called for
construction of improvements upon property owned by
the appellants and located in Utah County.
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A second cause of action not involved in this appeal
sought judgment against the defendant V. Lewis Kofford for the balance owing on his contract with the
respondents herein.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
None of the parties requested a jury trial. Case
was tried bv the court with the Honorable Allen B.
Sorensen presiding on November 17, 1971, and was
concluded on that date and taken under advisement.
On N m·ember 29, 1971, the Court entered its order
granting judgment in favor of the respondents and
against the appellants in the amount of $1551.00 from
which judgment this appeal is taken. Judgment was
further granted against the respondents and in favor of
the defendant V. Lewis Kofford, no cause of action,
from which judgment no appeal was taken.
RELIEF SOlTGHT. ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an order of this court affirming
in total the decision of the trial court.
OF FACTS
The revelant facts are as follows:
In October, Hl68, the appellant herein owned a
vacant parcel of real property in Provo City, Utah
County. Sometime shortly prior to October 24, of that
year, they entered into a contract to construct thereon a
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building to include a 160,000 BTU furnace for an unknmvn amount but which \Vas always conceded to be in
excess of $500.00. These facts were never disputed.
(See page 5 of appellants' brief). On October 28th,
1968, the respondents herein, under a sub-contract
entered onto the premisses and proceeded to install in
the building under construction a furnace as described
above, together with its related duct work, heat registers
and thermostrats. '\Tith the exception of a heat register
which could not then be obtained and installed, the respondents contract was completed on December 6th, 1968.
The missing reg.ster, which because of its peculiar size,
had to be specially ordered, was secured sometime subsequent to that date and was installed on February 19,
1969, thus completing the job. H.espondents thereafter
commenced this action on February 13, 1970, to recover
$1551.00 from the appellants under the provisions of
14-2-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the so-called
bond law. The history of the action from that point is a
matter of record. A pre-trial conference was held before
the llonorahle Allen B. Sorensen on October 8, 1971,
at which time the Court entered a pre-trial order restricting the trial to essentially the single factual issue, so
far as the parties to this appeal are concerned, of the
applicability of the one-year statute of limitations set
out in 14-2-2, Utah Code Annotated. The Court specifically found in granting judgment in favor of the respondents upon that issue, that the last materials were
furnished and last labor performed within one (1) year
prior to the time the respondents' action was commenced.
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(See paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact, Record on
appeal Item 37) and that as a matter of law the action
was commenced within the time required by the applicable statute of limitations (See paragraph I Conclusions
of Law, record on appeal item 37).
Two weeks after the court entered its pre-trial
order setting forth the issues to be tried, the appeUant
moved to amend the same to include the additional affirmative defense of estoppel, which was never pleaded,
to go along with there affirmative defense of the statutes of limitations, which also was never pleaded. The
motion was argued before the court and was denied.
The following portions of the statement of facts
in the appeUants' brief are disputed:
1.- Appelllant's statement in the second paragraph

of page 5 stating that "the plaintiff had the burden of
showing that they were within the one ( 1) year statute
of limitations, which meant that all work had to be completed on or prior to February 13, 1969.
Respontle11ts dispute this as a matter of law.
The last paragraph of page 5 of the appellants
brief stating that the plaintiff "conceded at trial that
they did not consi<ler the grill or register to be very
importaut to the job." (see trial transcript pages 23-24).
3. Appellants statement on page 7 of their brief
that they were unaware of the existence of Exhibit 5.
This fact is unknown to the respondent and does not appear of record.
2.
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'Vith reference to page 7 of appellant's brief,
the Court should note that the "card" referred to is not
evidence in this case as it was never identified or received by the trial court (see trial transcript page 75 line
27) although appellants brief implies fo the contrary.
4.

POINT I
TIIE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE THE
AUTHORITY GRANTED TO IT UNDER
RULE 16, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN RESTRICTING TlIE ISSUES TO BE
TRIED AND IN DENYING THE APPELLANTS'
TO Al\iEND THE PRE··
TRIAL ORDER.
The Court should keep in mind with reference to
Point one of the appelJants' argument that at no time
did the Court ever eliminate as an issue anything over
\vhich there was any dispute so far as the pleadings are
concerned. The relevant questions involving all points
·which would bring the case within the provisions of 142-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, including the balance
owing were specifically asked by the Court at the pretrial hearing and answered, and the issues as framed
are not inconsistent with those answers. (Pre-trial transcript).
The appellants sought to have reserved as an issue
there affirmative defense of estoppel which is required,
under Rule 8 ( c) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
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be affirmatively pleaded. This was not something that
the Court arbitrarily took away from them, but was an
affirmative defense which they had failed to plead in
the first place and which they had failed to clearly define, even at the pre-trial conference, and which they
felt injustly deprived of because their motion to amend
the llre-trial order to include their unpleaded defense
was denied.
In judging the Court's attitude toward the appellant
throughout the proceedings which the appellant implies
was hostile, you should keep in mind that th one affirmative defense upon which the case turned was never
pleaded affirmatively by the appellant as required by
Rule 8 ( c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but was
ne\'er-the-less reserved as an issue by the Court for the
beneft of the appellants.
To have included the estoppel defense or counter
claim in whatever form the appellants may have chosen
would not only have been inconsistent wth the pre-trial
order and the appellants representation made thereat,
but would have created an entirely new lawsuit requiring discovery on issues never before contemplated although the case was, at that time, almost 20 months old,
a senior citizen by Fourth District Court standards.

POINT II
TJIE
011" THE TRIA'L COURT
REJECTING THE APPELLANTS OFFER OF
PROOF ON THE ·QUESTION OF ESTOPPEL
UNDER THE ISSUES AS FRA1"1ED BY THE
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PLEADING AND THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER
IS CORRECT.
Although the record of these proceeclings is void
of the evidence claimed to exist in Point II of the appe1lants argument it is respectfully submitted that as a
matter of law a materialman who otherwise comes within the provisions of 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, has
an absolute right to not only waive his lien rights and
remain silent for a year, but to spend that year looking
to his general contractor or not looking to him as he
sees fit without jepoardizing his bond law rights, unless,
of course, he accepts payment in the form of a note as
was done in the Apex Lumber Case cited on page 14 of
the appellants brief.
The appellants claim to have been damaged by the
respondents silence and yet they set forth in their
answers to interrigatories (See answer to Interrogatories
No. 5, Record on Appeal 20) That the general
contractor, prior to commencing construction of the
building involved, already owed them more than the
contract price for constructing the building and that
they considered him paid in advance for its constn1ction.
It is difficult under those circumstances to see how they
can accuse the respondents by their "sober silence to the
everlasting damage of other creditors" (see page 16 of
appe1lants' brief) of being responsible for any debts to
them that Kofford didn't pay. On the contrary, that
position appears to be nothing more than a complete fabrication.
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POINT III
TIIE TRIAL COlJRT'S FINDINGS THAT
UESPONDENT'S . ACTION WAS
LY FILED IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIAS A
OF FACT AND IS
CORECT AS A l\IATTER OF LA\V.
The trial Court found as a fact that the last material was furnished by the respondents on February 19,
1969, and that the action was filed within one year from
that date. If this finding is supported by any evidence
which the Court could find to be true then it must stand
on appeal. (See DeVas vs. Noble, 369 P.2d 290, 13 Ut.
2d, 133.).
The points claimed in support of Point No. III on
page 17 of Appellants' brief alleging that the plaintiffs e:ther considered the job complete prior to that
time, or deliberately withheld the completion of the same,
is pure conjecture and was not found by the Court· to
he the fact. On the contrary, respondents, at that time,
would have no motive for intentionally delaying the
job's completion because they had a full year before
any hond law rights expired. It was not a matter of
cook;ng up some additional unfinished work to renew
those rights because they had not expired.
The words of 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated are
clear. The one year statute of limitations commences to
run on the date "the last materials were furnished".
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This language does not require any interpretation. Its
meaning is clear, concise and unambligious.
It is not disputed that if the trial court had found
that the installation of the materials was deliberately
delayed to delay the expiration of a statute of limitations,
and if such a finding could be supported by the records,
which it could not, we might have a different case before
this court, possibly one upon which some sort of "Scint=Ua of work theory" could be justified. You have no
such case before you.
This court should keep in mind that the appellants
have never paid anyone for the furnace yet. Kofford's
debt that they claim was worked off by its installation
already existed at the time the work was done by the
respondents. All they do by resisting this action is seek
to reduce the debt they allmved the Kofford Company
to run up by letting the respondents hang for part of
it, a position entirely inconsistent, it appears, with any
theory of equity that they asked this Court to recognize
on their behalf.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

\VOOTTON and WOOTTON
N oall T. Wootton
8 North Center Street

American Fork, Utah 84003

Attorneys for Respondents

